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EXTRADITION AND MENTAL HEALTH IN UK LAW
ABSTRACT. The response of UK extradition law and practice to requested persons
presenting with mental health disorders is multi-faceted and unnecessarily complex.
There are a number of reasons for this. They centre upon the law failing to ade-
quately recognise that mental health cases can give rise to concerns not present in
physical health cases. The deﬁciencies of the law are found in the three applicable
bars to extradition; oppression, human rights and forum. They also can be seen in
the applicable rules of evidence and the practice of diplomatic assurances. The time
has come for UK law to speciﬁcally and systematically respond to mental health
disorders in the context of extradition.
I INTRODUCTION
The response of UK extradition law and practice to requested per-
sons presenting with mental health disorders is multi-faceted and
unnecessarily complex. The issues raised are not consistently ad-
dressed. The reasons for this are manifold and inter-related. They are
ﬁrstly that extradition law fails to adequately recognise that mental
health cases can engender distinct concerns. This is seen in the sim-
ilarity in approach taken to deportation and physical illness on the
one hand and mental health disorders on the other. It is also manifest
in the operation of the three diﬀerent, intricate and at times over-
lapping bars which may prevent an extradition in mental health cases.
The response to the evidential challenges arising in the area further
illustrates the deﬁciency of the law. Secondly, where the law has
speciﬁcally recognised that mental health cases may be distinct that
acceptance is wanting. This recognition has occurred where requested
persons may be at risk of suicide and within the substance of diplo-
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matic assurances, including where an individual may be unﬁt to
plead. The law here has developed a bespoke set of ‘‘suicide-case’’
rules and employed diplomatic assurances in response to some of the
concerns. Whilst positive, these developments are inadequate and
inconsistent. Overall, the deﬁcient nature of the law arises from its
failure to systematically recognise and coherently address the con-
cerns that often arise in mental health cases. This article analyses the
response of UK extradition law to mental health disorders and
uncovers the reasons behind its deﬁciencies. In doing so it brings to
the fore the steps needed to address the weaknesses in the law. The
applicable law and jurisprudence including the notable cases of Shi-
ren Dewani,1Lauri Love2 and Haroon Aswat3 are described and
analysed in this task. The article concludes by bringing together the
suggestions of how the law might be amended so that it responds
more appropriately to requested persons with mental health disor-
ders.4
II EXTRADITION LAW
Extradition is a process whereby accused and convicted persons are
lawfully transferred from one territory to another for trial or, if al-
1 South Africa v Dewani [2012] EWHC 842 (Admin), South Africa v Dewani (No 2)
[2014] EWHC 153 (Admin) and Dewani v South Africa [2014] EWHC 770 (Admin).
2 US v Love [2016] Lloyd’s Rep. F.C. 597 and Love v US [2018] EWHC 172
(Admin).
3 Ahmad v US [2006] EWHC 2927 (Admin), Aswat v UK (No 1) (2014) 58 EHRR
1, R (on the application of Aswat) v Secretary of State [2014] EWHC 1216 (Admin, R
(on the application of Aswat) v Secretary of State [2014] EWHC 3274 (Admin), and
Aswat v UK, Ap. No. 621/76/14, 6 January 2015, cited at https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng#.
4 ‘‘Mental health disorder’’ is used throughout this article in a lay sense as a
general description of both mental health conditions and developmental disorders. It
is not suggested that mental and physical illnesses per se are existentially diﬀerent,
rather that the former can give rise to concerns in the context of extradition that the
latter does not. Refuting the view that mental and physical illnesses are distinct
generally is Kendell, R.E., The Distinction between Mental and Physical Illness,
(2001) 178 British Journal of Psychiatry 490. Discussing the various models or
paradigms of understanding psychological abnormality, reﬂecting the diﬀerences in
understanding, is Comer, R.J., Abnormal Psychology, Tenth Edition, Worth Pub-
lishers, New York, 2018, chapter 3.
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ready convicted, punishment.5 It is largely governed in the UK by the
Extradition Act 2003 (2003 Act) and internationally by the European
Arrest Warrant (EAW) and bilateral extradition treaties.6 The 2003
Act contains separate provision for EU and non-EU extraditions.
The main diﬀerences in law between the two are that under the EAW
there is an absence of political participation in the process and the
Framework List of oﬀences can act to satisfy the double criminality
requirement. Practically, the EAW has led to a material increase in
the volume of UK-EU surrenders, which in turn has given rise to a
considerable jurisprudence. Extradition jurisprudence, under the
EAW or otherwise, arises from the fact that when an extradition
request is made to the UK a hearing must take place where a number
of bars may be put forward in opposition. If accepted by the judge,
the extradition will not proceed, or be adjourned. There are three
bars in the 2003 Act that can act to stop an extradition on the basis of
a mental health disorder. They are based on oppression and injustice,
human rights and forum.7 The law sets high hurdles that must be met
for an extradition to be prevented under the bars. This is a conse-
quence of both their terms per se and their judicial interpretation.
Recognition and consideration of mental health disorders in extra-
dition law is relatively novel. Legislatively, mental health was referred
to for the ﬁrst time in the 2003 Act. Mental health extradition
jurisprudence began to emerge around the same time, ﬁrstly in the
case law of the ECtHR.
5 Requests can therefore be either ‘‘accusation’’ or ‘‘conviction’’. See generally the
House of Lords Select Committee on Extradition Law, Extradition: UK Law and
Practice, 10 March 2015, cited at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/
ldselect/ldextradition/126/126.pdf and A Review of Extradition, published in
September 2011 (the Baker Review), cited at https://www.gov.uk/government/up
loads/…/extradition-review.pdf.
6 The basis of the EAW is a 2002 Framework Decision, cited at https://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32002F0584. It is noteworthy that
the terms of the EAW itself, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and jurisprudence of
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) have not, to date, had a material
eﬀect upon UK extradition law in the area of mental health. Instead the law is almost
exclusively organic to the UK, and inﬂuenced by the jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Outside the EU the UK has extradition agree
ments with over 100 states and territories, see https://www.gov.uk/guidance/extra
dition-processes-and-review.
7 For the purposes of this article ‘‘bar’’ will include all grounds which may prevent
an extradition.
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III EXTRADITION AND DEPORTATION
Providing background and context to the response of extradition law
to mental health disorders are deportation and physical ill-health
extradition jurisprudence. This follows the aﬃnity between extradi-
tion and deportation and the general conﬂation of mental and
physical illness by extradition law. For our present purposes, the
main relevance of deportation is found the application of human
rights law. In Balodis-Klocko v Latvia8 it was held that there is no
distinction between the immigration line of authority and that of
extradition in the application of human rights.9 A second relevance of
deportation is that diplomatic assurances are relied upon to address
human rights concerns where it is proposed, as with extradition. This
relevance noted, it should not be forgotten that extradition and
deportation diﬀer in their origins, purposes and applicable law. A
request from a third territory forms the origin of an extradition while
a deportation is founded upon a UK decision to expel an individual
from its territory. The purpose of (outgoing) extradition is a prose-
cution or imposition of a sentence abroad. Deportation acts to serve
the UK public good. Legally, extradition is generally governed by the
2003 Act and, in England and Wales, the Criminal Procedure Rules10
and the Extradition Act 2003 Police Codes of Practice.11 Deportation
is governed by the Immigration Acts, the Immigration Rules12 and a
collection of Home Oﬃce Guides.13 It is worth keeping these facts in
mind when deportation cases are relied upon or referred to in
extradition cases. Indeed, an argument can be made that in light of
the considerable diﬀerences between the two processes that there is a
greater distinction between them, especially in mental health cases.
8 [2014] EWHC 2661 Admin.
9 Ibid at para 18.
10 Part 50 of the Criminal Procedure Rules applies to extradition, at https://www.
justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/criminal/docs/2015/crim-proc-rules-2015-part-
50.pdf. A further diﬀerence between extradition and deportation is that UK
nationals cannot be deported.
11 Found at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/extradition-act-2003-
police-codes-of-practice.
12 ‘‘Immigration Acts’’, deﬁned by s 61 of the Borders Act 2007 includes ten
statutes starting with the Immigration Act 1971. Part 13 of the Immigration Rules
govern deportation, at https://www.gov.uk/guidance/immigration-rules/immigra
tion-rules-part-13-deportation.
13 A number of which are found here https://www.gov.uk/topic/immigration-op
erational-guidance/modernised-guidance.
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IV EXTRADITION AND HEALTH GENERALLY
Ill-health, mental and physical, has been a basis upon which an
extradition can be prevented for a relatively short time. It was the
ground upon which the extradition of Augusto Pinochet to Spain was
blocked in 2000.14 In part due to the controversy engendered by that
case the extent of political discretion in extradition cases to cover ill-
health was limited and ss 25 and 91 were inserted into the 2003 Act.
Termed the ‘‘lex specialis’’15 in cases of ill-health generally the sec-
tions prevent an extradition where it is oppressive or unjust on the
basis of the physical or mental condition of the requested person
(hereinafter the oppression bar). If an argument is accepted under the
bar the requested person is discharged or his hearing is adjourned.
Illustrating the diﬃculty in meeting the bar and the range of relevant
considerations where physical health is put forward is Blaszak v
Poland.16 Blaszak was sought on a conviction warrant. Subsequent to
his sentence he suﬀered a stroke which left him with limited strength,
movement, speech and memory. He became epileptic and suﬀered
from regular seizures. He sought to rely on s 25. The court considered
not only his ill-health and prognosis but also the relevant safeguards
and conditions under the law and in the prisons in Poland. These
were considered in light of certain presumptions arising from Po-
land’s membership of the EU and the ECHR – in essence that it
would adhere to its legal obligations.17 The Court also assessed
Blaszak’s culpability and oﬀences. The ‘‘exceptionally high bar’’
applying when ill-health was put forward in opposition to impris-
onment within the UK was held to apply to extradition and his ap-
peal against extradition was refused.18
The human rights bar, a second ground which may cover ill-
health, is also diﬃcult to satisfy and can entail judicial consideration
of disparate factors. Two human rights are most commonly put
forward, found in articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention of
Human Rights (ECHR). The former prohibits torture and inhuman
and degrading treatment and punishment and the latter guarantees
respect for private and family life. Demonstrating the high bar is the
14 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/663886.stm.
15 So designated in Surico v Italy [2018] EWHC 401 (Admin) at para 31.
16 [2016] EWHC 2412 (Admin).
17 Ibid at para 15.
18 Arguments on the basis of human rights were also made and rejected.
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leading article 3 physical ill-health case of N v UK.19 Here the UK
sought to deport N to Uganda. She was receiving treatment for Aids.
The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR held that aliens could not in
principle claim any entitlement to remain in a state party in order to
continue to beneﬁt from medical, social or other forms of assistance
and services. A violation of article 3, it held, will not be established
even if the expulsion would interrupt treatment, lead to a deteriora-
tion in health or increase morbidity.20 The height of the bar in article
3 cases is such that it is limited to so-called ‘‘deathbed’’ cases.21 What
needs to be emphasised about extradition and health generally are
that human rights and oppression may act as a bar, a high hurdle
must be met to prevent an extradition under them, and that a wide
range of factors are considered by courts when they are put forward.
Further and notably, courts have not systematically recognised and
considered the distinct issues that may arise where the disorder is one
of mental as opposed to physical health. It is suggested that this
recognition is called for.
V EXTRADITION AND MENTAL HEALTH
A ﬁrst point to address in considering extradition and mental health
within the UK is the scale of persons extradited generally, the per-
centage of those who put forward mental health disorders and the
types of those disorders. The information available for each is these is
very limited and/or anecdotal. It is clear, though, that the scale of
extradition and surrender is signiﬁcant, particularly under the EAW.
In the calendar year 2016 the UK received 13,797 EAW requests and
surrendered 1431 individuals to fellow EU member states.22 Outside
19 [2008] 47 EHRR 39. See Battjes, H., In Search of a Fair Balance: the Absolute
Character of the Prohibition of Refoulment under Article 3 Reassessed, (2009) 22(3)
Leiden Journal of International Law 538.
20 A factually similar extradition case is Dzgoev v Russia [2017] EWHC 735
(Admin). Here an argument based on article 3 was rejected where Dzgoev was
suﬀering from Aids and hepatitis C regardless of whether extradition would interrupt
treatment, lead to a deterioration in his condition or increase morbidity. A leading
article 8 extradition and physical health case is Norris v USA [2010] UKSC 9. See
further Stephen, C., We Want You: Extradition in the UK Supreme Court, (2011)
15(1) Edinburgh Law Review 133.
21 See, for example, SL (St Lucia) v Secretary of State [2018] EWCA Civ 1894, at
para 19.
22 The National Crime Agency collates EAW statistics, at http://www.national
crimeagency.gov.uk/publications/european-arrest-warrant-statistics. The NCA is
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the EU the number is considerably smaller, in the ﬁnancial year
2012–2013 84 requests from Category 2 territories were made to
England and Wales.23 The number of requested persons who were
actually extradited over this period is not available. Nor is the
number of requested persons who put forward mental health disor-
ders as a bar to extradition, and the fate of such arguments. Anec-
dotally, however, it can be assumed that the number of cases where
mental health arguments are made is not insigniﬁcant. A considerable
number of reported extradition cases contain mental health-related
arguments – these form the basis of the analysis below. As to the
mental health disorders aﬀecting requested persons, again there is no
available information. From the present research, however, persons
with autism, and in particular Asperger’s Syndrome are prominent.
Other disorders forming the basis of arguments against extradition
have included paranoid schizophrenia, depression, and post-trau-
matic stress disorder. In Howes v HMA,24 a leading case in Scotland
on the issue, the requested person was diagnosed with an adjustment
disorder with the predominant symptoms of anxiety, panic attacks
and compulsive behaviour. Overall, the only point that can be made
certainty is that there is a near complete dearth of empirical infor-
mation in the area. That noted, the response of extradition law to
mental health disorders is clear, albeit unsatisfactorily so.
The failure of the law to consistently and adequately consider the
unique issues in mental health cases is seen in the operation and terms
of the oppression and human rights bars. Recognising those issues, in
the context of article 3, has been the Court of Appeal where it stated:
‘‘There has been some debate in our domestic case-law as to the
extent to which cases of mental illness… are analogous to cases of
physical illness for the purposes of the application of article 3. Whilst
there may be factual diﬀerences between the two types of case… the
Footnote 22 continued
now the UK’s ‘‘Central Authority’’ under the EAW Framework Decision. The
considerable disparity between requests and surrenders is not explained in the
statistics. Amongst the reasons however, are the policies of some states, notably
Poland, to issue requests for all alleged crimes and sentences and the NCA does not
certify the request for reasons of proportionality or legal validity. It is not explained
in any material sense by courts in the UK refusing surrender or extradition. Judicial
refusals are exceptional.
23 The House of Lords Select Committee on Extradition Law, supra note 5 at p 38.
24 2010 SLT 337 so described inWlodarczyk v Lord Advocate [2012] HCJAC 41 at
para 34.
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same principles are to be applied to them both’’.25 Conﬁrming the
general lack of diﬀerentiation between mental and physical cases are
the terms of the oppression bar. Section 25(2) inter alia provides that
an extradition is barred, or should be adjourned, where the extradi-
tion judge ﬁnds that ‘‘… the physical or mental condition of the
person… is such that it would be unjust or oppressive to extradite
him’’. The same law applies in spite of mental and physical health
cases being – to an extent at least – factually dissimilar. It is not
suggested, of course, that the law must explicitly accommodate,
legislatively or judicially, all factually distinct cases – this is impos-
sible. It is argued, however, that mental health extradition cases do
merit a degree of systematically bespoke legal consideration because
of the scale of diﬀerence between them, including a number of issues
that arise in mental health cases that do not in physical health cases.
Further, it is suggested that where diﬀerentiation has taken place it
has been inconsistent and inadequate.
The factual diﬀerences between mental and physical health dis-
orders in the context of extradition are such to merit an element of
diﬀerentiation under the law. This is not to suggest that there are not
similarities between them. Medical treatment is necessary in both.
Arguments based upon the importance of the care one is receiving
within the UK, the eﬀect of its withdrawal, and the lesser nature of
the medical treatment and facilities in the requesting state can
therefore be made in each. As to the latter the ECtHR stated in N v
UK:
‘‘The decision to remove an alien who is suﬀering from a serious mental or
physical illness to a country where the facilities for the treatment of that illness
are inferior to those available in the contracting state may raise an issue under
Art.3, but only in a very exceptional case, where the humanitarian grounds
against the removal are compelling’’.26
It is clear that both types of illness may call for medical facilities and/
or drugs which may be available in the UK and not, or to a lesser
extent, in the requesting state.27 To this extent mental and physical
25 RA (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2008] EWCA
Civ 1210, at para 49.
26 Supra note 19 at para 42.
27 A diﬀerence in the type and availability of drugs used in treating schizophrenia
was considered in Bensaid v UK (2001) 33 EHRR 10. The case, one of the leading
mental health precedents, is discussed below.
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health disorders are rightfully treated similarly. There are diﬀerences
between the two, however, in both degree and substance.
The underlying commonalities between mental and physical health
extradition cases only go so far. There are issues which are attendant
to mental health cases alone. Further, there are factors present in
both which can be particularly pronounced within mental health
cases. The latter arise from the fact that the process of extradition,
including a foreign trial, detention and perhaps imprisonment, and
indeed the transfer itself, is often likely to have a greater eﬀect upon
someone suﬀering from a mental illness than otherwise. In other
words, the dislocation and hardship that all persons subjected to
extradition experience may be considerably exacerbated for persons
suﬀering from certain mental illnesses. This was held to be the case in
Love v US, discussed below. Related to this is the likely enhanced
eﬀect of an extradition upon an individual with a mental health
disorder due to the necessary separation from his home, family and
support network in the UK. These diﬀerences between mental and
physical cases are a matter of degree. The same circumstances befall
those with mental and physical health disorders but it is more likely
that they will have a greater impact on the former. More relevant in
setting mental health cases apart from physical cases are the distinct
issues that arise in them alone. These are particular evidential con-
siderations, the risk of suicide and the ﬁtness to plead of the requested
person. Each of these issues will be speciﬁcally discussed below.
Firstly, however, the failings of extradition law more generally as
regards mental health will be exposed through a description and
analysis of the three applicable bars to extradition. The inadequate
and inconsistent recognition and accommodation of the diﬀerences
between mental and physical health cases will be established. The
weaknesses in the law will be seen to militate in favour of a
rationalisation of the bars, in both application and number.
VI THREE GERMANE BARS
The three bars which may come into play where a requested person
presents with a mental health disorder, oppression, human rights and
forum, each have their own terms and jurisprudence. None of them
were designed to speciﬁcally address mental health disorders. The
bars are of diﬀerent pedigree. The oldest is that based on oppression.
Its origins are found in the Fugitive Oﬀenders Act 1881. The newest is
the forum bar, being inserted into the 2003 Act by the Crime and
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Courts Act 2013. Human rights as an explicit bar in UK law dates
from 1 January 2004, when the 2003 Act entered into force. What the
bars have in common, in addition to being applicable in mental
health cases, is that they contribute to the complex and unsatisfactory
response of the law in the area.
6.1 Oppression and Injustice
6.1.1 Derivation and Meaning
Sections 25 and 91 of the 2003 Act contain the oppression bar for
Category 1 (EU) and 2 (generally non-EU) territories respectively.
Kakis v Government of the Republic of Cyprus28 is accepted as pro-
viding an authoritative interpretation of the words ‘‘oppression’’ and
‘‘injustice’’ in extradition. Here Lord Diplock stated ‘‘Unjust’ I re-
gard as directed primarily to the risk of prejudice to the accused in the
conduct of the trial itself, ‘‘oppressive’’ as directed to hardship to the
accused resulting from changes in his circumstances that have oc-
curred during the period to be taken into consideration; but there is
room for overlapping, and between them they would cover all cases
where to return him would not be fair’’.29 The adoption of this
understanding, being made in the context of the passage of time
under the Fugitive Oﬀenders Act 1967, is not particularly useful.30
This is because it suggests that the passage of time is an operative
consideration. However, time may, or may not, be a relevant factor.
The bar requires a court to look at the fairness of extradition pro-
ceedings if a person is unﬁt as well as the consequences of extradition
were it to take place.31 This includes taking into account conditions in
both the UK at the time of the hearing and within the requesting
state, speculatively, after extradition. Regard is to be had to ‘‘… all
the relevant circumstances, including the fact that extradition is
ordinarily likely to cause stress and hardship [that] will inevitably
vary from case to case’’.32 Conditions in the requesting state need not
28 [1978] 1 WLR 779.
29 Ibid at p 782. Within the UK jurisdictions somewhat similar pleas can be made
in bar of trial. In Scotland, for example, oppression can be put forward where has
there been prejudice so grave as to be incapable of being removed by an appropriate
direction to the jury, or by other appropriate action on the part of the trial judge, so
as to give the accused a fair trial. See Stuurman v HMA 1980 JC 111.
30 It was adopted, inter alia, in South Africa v Dewani, supra note 1 at para 74.
31 Nicholls, C., et al, The Law of Extradition and Mutual Assistance, Third Edition,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, para 5.114.
32 South Africa v Dewani, supra note 1 at para 73.
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be similar to those within the UK, rather, the court seeks to ascertain
whether the diﬀerence in treatment is such that extradition would be
oppressive.33 Clearly, mental and physical disorders are not distin-
guished in general understandings of the bar.
6.1.2 Burden and Standard of Proof and Threshold
Critical to the operation of the bar are the burden of establishing it,
the required standard of proof and the threshold at which courts hold
it met. As regard the burden, it is clear that the onus falls upon the
requested person to establish that it would be oppressive or unjust to
extradite him because of his mental or physical health. The standard
at which the burden is discharged is the balance of probabilities,
although there is dicta to suggest that there is in fact a higher stan-
dard.34 As to the threshold, the law struggles to clearly and precisely
set a test that must be met where courts can hold it successfully
invoked. The law is that each case turns on its speciﬁc facts. In South
Africa v Dewani, for example, the court strongly discouraged the
citation of previous decisions.35 A degree of judicial guidance on the
requisite threshold is clearly needed, however. It is not diﬃcult to
ﬁnd. In Howes v HMA the High Court of Justiciary stated ‘‘… in
practice a high threshold has to be reached…’’.36 That height reﬂects
countervailing considerations including the public interest in giving
eﬀect to treaty obligations in extradition cases and that the UK’s
extradition partners ‘‘… are likely to have adequate facilities avail-
able for treating the health problems of persons whose extradition is
requested’’.37
Whilst the height of the threshold is established the question of
whether it is ﬁxed or relative is not. This is relevant because if relative
it could admit a degree of ﬂexibility and accommodate diﬀering cir-
cumstances. Mental and physical health cases, for example, could be
distinguished. This is what happened in South Africa v Dewani. It was
held that whilst an adjournment under s 91 was appropriate where a
33 R (on the application of Mikolajczyk) v Poland [2010] EWHC 3503 (Admin) at
para 16–17.
34 In Griﬃn v France [2011] EWHC 943 (Admin) the High Court stated that the
burden was perhaps to a higher standard, following that suggested by the ECtHR, at
para 47. Whilst generally helpful in ensuring consistency, this view of the ECtHR is
an example of the at times less than ideal eﬀect of its jurisprudence.
35 South Africa v Dewani, supra note 1 at para 73.
36 Supra note 24 at para 13.
37 Ibid.
EXTRADITION AND MENTAL HEALTH IN UK LAW
person was recovering from an acute injury or physical illness because
the prognosis for recovery was certain, ‘‘… in other cases where the
quantiﬁcation of the degree of risk to life is less certain and the
prognosis is also less certain the interests of justice require consid-
eration of that person being brought to trial’’.38 This is signiﬁcant. It
suggests that the threshold for an adjournment is in fact higher in
mental health cases than physical health cases. Whether this also
applies to a discharge is not stated. The court’s reasoning was that the
greater uncertainty in the risk to life and prognosis in mental health
cases weighed in favour of extradition rather than against it. It is
suggested that, in such circumstances, it is not unreasonable to come
to the opposite conclusion – that in the face of greater uncertainty the
threshold should lower, not rise.
6.1.3 Mental and Physical Health Distinction
There has been limited recognition of the distinction between mental
and physical health cases under the oppression bar. As just seen, a
higher threshold may attach to mental health cases than exists in
physical cases. More signiﬁcantly, the law has recognised that two
particular issues merit especial consideration. These are ﬁtness to
plead and the risk of suicide.39 Fitness to plead cases arise where there
is agreement on the matter at the extradition hearing; the position
where there is disagreement will be mentioned below.40 In South
Africa v Dewani, it was agreed Dewani was unﬁt for trial at the time
of his appeal and that it was not known when he would be ﬁt in the
future. The Court had to decide whether it was oppressive or unjust
to extradite in the circumstances. It held that it might be oppressive
or unjust to extradite Dewani without considering whether an
assurance should be required providing that he would be free to
return to the UK after a speciﬁed period of time if he remained
unﬁt.41 South Africa subsequently gave such an assurance (the period
38 South Africa v Dewani, supra note 1 at paras 76–77.
39 The risk of suicide is discussed separately below because all three bars have been
held to be applicable to it.
40 For a discussion of ﬁtness to plead in extradition in an intra-US context see Peil,
J., et al, Determining a Criminal Defendant’s Competency to Proceed With an
Extradition Hearing, (2015) 43 Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and
Law 201. See in regard to Gary McKinnon Mackenzie, R., and Watts, R., Injustice
and Disabilities: the Case against the Extradition of Gary McKinnon to the USA,
(2010) 15 Tizard Learning Disability Review 45.
41 South Africa v Dewani (No 2), supra note 1, at paras 59–60.
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being 18 months) and Dewani was extradited. This development is
one of a select number that have accommodated mental health dis-
orders in extradition in a bespoke way. It has been applied incon-
sistently, however. Contrasting with South Africa v Dewani is Lord
Advocate v SN,42 where Sheriﬀ Crowe exercised his discretion under s
71(2) of 2003 Act and refused to issue an arrest warrant where the
requested person was found permanently unﬁt to plead and travel. Of
more relevance and concern is the fact that there is no over-arching
judicial, or indeed legislative, guidance on the practice of seeking
ﬁtness to plead assurances. In certain cases extradition has taken
place in the absence of assurances where a requested person is unﬁt.
The lack of guidance may give rise to inconsistency, and may operate
to the detriment of requested persons.43
Whilst the law has come to accommodate ﬁtness to plead and
suicide cases under the oppression bar, it has not distinguished more
generally between mental and physical health cases. The terms of the
bar refer to them jointly and the jurisprudence provides that the
likelihood of stress or hardship upon a requested person, whether he
presents with physical or mental health concerns, is not normally
relevant.44 Courts normally respond to mental disorders as they do to
physical illness. In Boudhiba v Central Examining Court, where a
requested person suﬀered from a psychiatric disorder and low intel-
ligence, the court stated:
‘‘It is important, in my view, that the court should keep its eye ﬁrmly on the
statutory question posed by section 25. The question is not whether the
appellant is suﬀering from a psychiatric disorder with or without the added
disadvantage of low intelligence; it is whether, by reason of his mental con-
dition it would unjust or oppressive to extradite him’’.45
The accommodation of mental health disorders under the oppression
bar, therefore, only goes so far.
42 [2017] SC EDIN 69.
43 An example is Bobbe v Poland, [2017] EWHC 3161 (Admin). The position is
discussed below under the heading of diplomatic assurances.
44 Gomes v Trinidad and Tobago, [2009] 1 WLR 1038 at para 31. The case con-
cerned the time bar, rather than ill-health.
45 [2006] EWHC 167 (Admin) at para 65.
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6.2 Human Rights
6.2.1 Derivation and Meaning
Human rights form the basis of the second bar that can apply inmental
health cases. It is found in ss 21(1) and 87(1) of the 2003Act. It provides
that extraditionsmust be compatible with human rights. If they are not
the requested person must be discharged. Signiﬁcantly, the protection
extends to possible future human rights violationswithin the requesting
territory as well as those grounded in the UK.46 The leading ECtHR
mental health removal case is Bensaid v UK.47 It established that a
mental health disorder may form the basis of a human rights argument
against removal. Bensaid inter alia argued his deportation would vio-
late articles 3 and 8 because he would receive a lesser level of medical
support inAlgeria. TheECtHRbegan establishing the important point
that article 3 could apply in a removal case even though the public
authorities in Algeria were not directly or indirectly responsible. This is
particularly relevant in health cases because requesting states may not
‘‘act’’ in the sense of doingor omitting to do something giving rise to the
violation. That established, the ECtHR held that the less favourable
Algerian circumstances were not decisive. The risks he faced were
speculative (again a particularly germane point inmental health cases).
Therewas not a suﬃciently real risk that his removalwould be contrary
to article 3.48 Bensaid’s article 8 was also rejected. Whilst the ECtHR
held that mental health must be regarded as a part of private life, it was
not established that Bensaid’s moral integrity was aﬀected so as to
engage article 8.
6.2.2 Burden and Standard of Proof and Threshold
The burden of proof under the human rights bar falls on the re-
quested person. To meet the standard of proof he must establish that
there is a real risk of a violation of his rights, meaning a ‘‘… risk
which is substantial and not merely fanciful; and it may be estab-
lished by something less than proof of a 51% probability’’.49 Once
46 The two loci of possible human rights violations have been designated foreign
and domestic, by Lord Bingham in Ullah v Secretary of State, [2004] 2 AC 323 at
para 9.
47 Supra note 27.
48 Ibid at para 40.
49 Brown v Rwanda [2009] EWHC 770 (Admin), at para 34. In R (Lodhi) v Sec of
State [2010] EWHC 567 (Admin) the court stated that ‘‘A real risk is more than a
mere possibility but is less than a greater probability than not than an event would
occur’’, at para 10.
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this is met the burden shifts to the requesting state to establish that
the violation will not take place. The court then is tasked with
deciding whether the bar is satisﬁed. Aﬀecting its decision is a pre-
sumption that the UK’s extradition partners, particularly members of
the Council of Europe and the EU, will respect human rights.50 The
threshold test that a court applies turns upon the right in question.
Under article 3 the court must ﬁnd strong grounds for believing that
there is a real risk the individual would be subjected to torture or
inhuman treatment etcetera.51 Where article 6 is argued, the court
must ﬁnd that the requested person has suﬀered or risks suﬀering a
ﬂagrant denial of justice in the requesting state.52 Under article 8 the
court must decide if the extradition unlawfully interferes with the
person’s respect for his private and family life. As a qualiﬁed right,
courts must decide if the interference is prescribed by law, necessary
in a democratic society and for one of the purposes stated in the
article. The essence of this examination is whether the interference is
outweighed by the public interest in extradition.53
6.2.3 Mental and Physical Health Distinction
Human rights jurisprudence has partially recognised a distinction
between mental and physical health disorders in extradition. This
development is relatively novel and largely conﬁned to ECtHR case
law.54 It is found in Ahmad v UK55 and Aswat v UK (No 1).56 In these
cases, the ECtHR has in eﬀect held that a degree of especial con-
sideration of persons with mental health disorders is merited and that
in such cases relatively speciﬁc mental-health related assurances may
50 See Jane v Lithuania [2018] EWHC 1122 (Admin) at para 17. As regards the EU
see RO (C-327/18 PPU) EU:C:2018:733, 19 September 2018.
51 R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator, [2004] 2 AC 323 at para 24, per Lord Bingham.
52 As to the role of the right to a fair trial in UK extradition law see Arnell, P, The
Contrasting Evolution of the Right to a Fair Trial in UK Extradition Law, [2018] 22(7)
IJHR 869.
53 HH v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic of Genoa, [2012] UKSC 25 at
para 8 per Lady Hale.
54 A rare UK reference to the distinction is found in the deportation case of El
Gazzaz v Secretary of State [2018] EWCA Civ 532 where Lord Justice Sales said, in
this mental health case, ‘‘… it is in fact diﬃcult to distinguish this case from a pure
medical case such as was addressed in GS (India)’’, at para 34, emphasis added.
55 (2013) 56 EHRR 1. See in regard to the fourth applicant in Ahmad v UK, Abu
Hamza, Arnell, P., The Legality and Propriety of the Trials of Abu Hamza, (2016)
4(2) Bergen Journal of Criminal Law & Criminal Justice 196.
56 Supra note 3.
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be required.57 This former development falls short of a being a tai-
lored rule, but rather is guidance on how the existing rules apply in
mental health cases. In considering the case of one of the com-
plainants in Ahmad v UK, Ahsan, in light of the highly restricted
regime of imprisonment he faced if convicted, the ECtHR stated:
‘‘… the assessment of whether the particular conditions of detention are
incompatible with the standards of art.3 has, in the case of mentally-ill persons,
to take into consideration their vulnerability and their inability, in some cases,
to complain coherently or at all about how they are being aﬀected by any
particular treatment. The feeling of inferiority and powerlessness which is
typical of persons who suﬀer from a mental disorder calls for increased vigi-
lance in reviewing whether the Convention has (or will be) complied with’’.58
In spite of this especial consideration, it was held Ahsan could be
extradited. It did not appear that the psychiatric services available to
him in the US prison would be unable to treat his mental health
disorder.59 Again therefore, as with the oppression bar, human rights
jurisprudence fails to generally and systematically recognise that
mental health cases may give rise to distinct issues.
6.3 The Forum Bar
6.3.1 Derivation and Meaning
The forum bar is the third bar that may act to prevent an extradition
on the basis of a mental health disorder.60 Its origins are found in
what were considered exorbitant claims to jurisdiction by the United
States, in particular as regards the prosecution of the so-called Nat-
West Three.61 The forum bar, found in ss 19B and 83A of the 2003
Act, provides that extradition is to be barred by reason of forum if it
would not be in the ‘‘interests of justice’’. An extradition is not in the
interests of justice if a substantial measure of the requested person’s
relevant activity was performed within the UK and that, having re-
57 Speciﬁc and bespoke mental health assurances were sought by the ECtHR in the
Aswat series of cases, mentioned below.
58 Supra note 55 at para 215, emphasis added.
59 Ibid at para 224. Criticising the extradition of Ahsan is Patel, I., The Impossible
Injustice of Talha Ahsan’s Extradition and Detention, The New Statesman, 21
February 2013, at https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2013/02/impossible-in
justice-talha-ahsan%E2%80%99s-extradition-and-detention.
60 See generally Arnell, P., The Forum Bar to Extradition, (2013) 24 SLT 169.
61 See R (Bermingham) v Director of the Serious Fraud Oﬃce [2006] EWHC 200
(Admin).
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gard to ‘‘speciﬁed matters’’, the extradition should not take place.
There are seven such matters. Of particular relevance to mental
health cases are the interests of victims and the connections between
the requested person and the UK. If a judge decides the bar is sat-
isﬁed he must order the person’s discharge. Illustrating the operation
of the bar is the case of Lauri Love. The US had sought his extra-
dition for a number of hacking oﬀences. Love suﬀered from Asperger
syndrome. He invoked the forum, human rights and oppression bars.
The District Judge rejected Love’s arguments, and his extradition was
ordered. Love successfully appealed in the ﬁrst case where the bar
was held to be satisﬁed, in Love v US.62 The High Court disagreed
with the District Judge on three points, two of which related to
Love’s mental health. Firstly, it found that Love’s extradition would
not be in the interests of victims because of the high risk that he
would not be ﬁt to stand trial in the US. Secondly, the High Court
placed greater weight on Love’s connection to the UK. It construed
‘‘connection’’ to cover Love’s mental health disorder and medical
treatment because of the particular nature of his condition and
treatment that connected him to the UK.63 It concluded that the
factors against extradition, Love’s mental health and the possibility
of a UK prosecution, outweighed those in favour suﬃciently clearly
to bar his extradition.
6.3.2 Burden and Standard of Proof and Threshold
The relative novelty of the forum bar makes a deﬁnitive iteration of
the applicable burden and standard of proof and threshold impos-
sible. However, from the terms of the bar and the limited jurispru-
dence, it appears that the burden ﬁrstly falls upon the requested
person, as with the other bars.64 As regards the standard of proof, the
requested person must meet a ‘‘gateway’’ condition – namely to
satisfy the judge that a substantial measure of his activity was per-
formed in the UK, as found in s ss 19B(2) and 83A(2).65 Subsequently
62 Supra note 2. His appeal was also allowed on the grounds of oppression. See
Arnell, P., The Case of Lauri Love, (2018) 182(8) Criminal Law and Justice Weekly.
63 Ibid.
64 This was the implication in Atraskevic v Lithuania [2015] EWHC 131 (Admin) at
para 13.
65 Atraskevic v Lithuania, ibid at para 40.
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the court considers the ‘‘… ultimate test… whether the extradition
would not be in the interests of justice’’.66 In applying that test the
‘‘court will be engaged in a fact-speciﬁc exercise’’.67 Only those
matters listed in ss 19B(3) and 83A(3) can be taken into account, no
others. Each factor must be considered, but the judge has to ‘‘decide
on the facts of the case before him. There is no ranking of importance
of the various factors… a value judgment overall’’ has to be made.68
That value judgment has been held to be very similar to that taken in
considering proportionality under article 8.69 That exercise was
authoritatively set out in Poland v Celinski,70 it entails an analysis of
the facts as found for and against extradition followed by reasoned
conclusions as to why extradition should be ordered or the defendant
discharged. The threshold under the forum bar, then, is met where
the factors in favour of extradition are outweighed by the interests of
justice as deﬁned by the speciﬁed matters in the bar.
6.3.3 Mental and Physical Health Distinction
Whether the forum bar diﬀerentiates between mental and physical
health disorders is unexplored. As seen, the terms of the bar do not
explicitly refer to either mental or physical health. The particular
reasoning in Love v US, however, may be interpreted to suggest
mental health disorders are of particular import in establishing the
forum bar. This follows the relevance of the requested person’s
connection with the UK under the bar. As noted, the High Court
held that Love’s mental health led to his relationship with his parents
being especially important. Their necessary support strengthened his
connection to the UK. Whilst persons suﬀering from physical health
concerns undoubtedly beneﬁt from the support of their families, in
Love’s case this support was of a diﬀerent order. Further in Love’s
case, the likelihood of suicide meant that the interests of victims
might not be met through extradition. These factors may support the
contention that mental health disorders have been distinguished from
physical illness under the forum bar. It should be noted, however,
that weighing against this interpretation is Scott v US, where the
66 Dibden v France [2014] EWHC 3074 (Admin), at para 18.
67 Ibid.
68 Atraskevic v Lithuania supra note 64 at para 14. In Scott v US [2018] EWHC
2021 (Admin) it is stated that ‘‘There is no predetermined hierarchy whereby one or
more factors will have greater signiﬁcance than others’’, at para 25.
69 Scott v US, ibid at para 32.
70 [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin) at para 15–17.
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requested person’s connection to the UK was one of the main factors
in substantiating the bar where neither mental nor physical health
was at issue.71 The forum bar, then, appears to be akin to the
oppression and human rights bars in not generally recognising the
distinction between mental and physical health disorders. Whilst this
non-recognition exists across the three bars it is possible to discern an
emerging approach which provides that speciﬁc mental health-related
circumstances fall under one or other bar.
VII THE THREE BARS AND MENTAL HEALTH
DISORDERS
More than one of the three bars to extradition applicable in mental
health cases are commonly put forward in the same case.72 This fact
more often than not simply evidences the fact that extent of, and
circumstances covered by, each bar is not clear or delimited. The
extent and circumstances may overlap. Requested persons contesting
extradition obviously wish to maximise the chances of their transfer
being barred. The invocation of multiple bars leads to unnecessary
complexity in the law. This follows, in part, from the variations be-
tween the standards of proof and thresholds under each. Greater
alignment between the bars would lead to a greater degree of clarity
and consistency. This could take the form of the ﬁrm acceptance of
the distinction between the circumstances covered by the bars – which
is emerging in the jurisprudence – or preferably fewer applicable bars.
It is suggested that a single bar, that based upon human rights, is
capable of acting in a manner that satisﬁes the interests of requested
persons and that of all the other conﬂicting interests in extradition
cases. In such a situation the law would become more focused and
coherent.73
71 Supra note 68 at para 57. This being the second case where the forum bar was
successfully invoked.
72 It should be noted that this overlap is not exclusive to mental health cases – it
also arises in physical health cases, and indeed cases where the health of the re-
quested person is not an issue.
73 Williams, in 1992, argued that the then emergence of human rights protection in
the extradition context had the eﬀect of lessening the need for the traditional safe-
guards in the process, such as double criminality and the bar on the extradition of
nationals, in Williams, S., Human Rights Safeguards and International Cooperation in
Extradition: Striking the Balance, (1992) 2 Criminal Law Forum 191. A somewhat
similar argument is put forward presently, that is the breadth and nature of the
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As the law stands there are three applicable bars in mental health
cases, and under them a degree of discernment between them is ar-
guably emerging. This is seen in Love v US and South Africa v De-
wani. In Love v US all three bars were put forward. Whilst the High
Court did not pronounce on the human rights bar, unfortunately, it
did ﬁnd that the forum and oppression bars went to diﬀerent facets of
his case. Particularly, Love’s connection with the UK was instru-
mental in establishing the forum bar, whilst the measures put in place
to prevent his suicide in the US substantiated the oppression bar.74
Somewhat similarly in South Africa v Dewani the oppression and
human rights bars were linked to distinct circumstances around
Dewani’s extradition. Namely, the risk of suicide went to the
oppression bar and South African prison conditions were measured
under the human rights bar. His appeal was allow under the former,
but not the latter. It must be noted that this type of approach is rare.
The breadth of the bars remains opaque and overlap is common. As
will be seen below, the risk of suicide is considered not only under the
oppression bar but also the human rights bar. Clearly the three bars
have developed in an incremental and ad hoc manner legislatively,
and the relationship between them lacks authoritative judicial pro-
nouncement. Further, the distinct issues arising in mental health
disorders have not been fully and systematically accommodated
across the three bars to extradition nor in regard to any single one.
Cumulatively these factors militate in favour of a rationalisation of
the bars to extradition applicable in mental health cases, and more
generally. This lack of speciﬁc and tailored recognition under the bars
is also found in the response of extradition law and practice to mental
health disorders evidentially.
VIII EVIDENTIAL CHALLENGES
The second area where extradition law has failed to consistently and
adequately recognise that distinct issues may arise in mental health
cases is evidence. Extradition mental health cases can often face
Footnote 73 continued
human rights bar is such to considerably weaken, if not obviate, the need for the
oppression and forum bars. If a need is felt to remain then there is scope for a judicial
reconsideration of the breadth of the human rights bar itself.
74 Supra note 2, at para 115. As to the latter the High Court held that those
measures would ‘‘… themselves likely have a seriously adverse eﬀect on his very
vulnerable and unstable mental and physical wellbeing’’, ibid.
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unorthodox and diﬃcult evidential challenges. These challenges can
contribute to the complex and seemingly random nature of the law in
the area. They arise from the necessity of adjudging the mental health
of a requested person within the context of the process, and the
breadth and nature of the subjects requiring decision. Four particular
issues can be identiﬁed. These are the not uncommon occurrence of
discordant diagnoses, the unseen nature of mental health disorders,
the fact that certain decisions must be taken on a prospective and
speculative basis and that mental health disorders arguably evolve
more quickly than physical illnesses. All of these issues exist simply
because a decision on the basis of mental health requires suﬃcient
evidence to convince a court that the applicable test is met. This
necessitates not only an evaluation of the requested person’s mental
health but may also require decision on the suitability of transfer
arrangements, the nature of medical treatment, psychiatric hospitals
and prison wards abroad, the likelihood of a requested person
remaining unﬁt to plead in foreign circumstances and the nature and
value of diplomatic assurances.75
8.1 Discordant Diagnoses
The evidential diﬃculties attendant to extradition mental health cases
arise, in part, from mental health professionals not uncommonly
disagreeing in their diagnoses and prognoses. In Polish Judicial
Authority v Wolkowicz, the Court concluded that the views of the two
psychiatrists in the case were irreconcilable.76 The Senior District
Judge was therefore obliged to weigh up both views and come to
conclusion in favour of one or the other. Notably, a diﬀerent ap-
proach is taken where medical opinions conﬂict in ﬁtness to plead
cases. In Edwards v US,77 the practice under the Extradition Act 1989
of allowing extradition in cases where there were diﬀerences in
medical opinion over ﬁtness to plead was argued to have changed
under the 2003 Act. This was rejected. The Court held that where
there was a genuine and legitimate dispute between medical experts
on a requested person’s ﬁtness to plead the issue ought to be deter-
75 Certain of these factors are not unique to mental health cases. Assurances and
prison conditions, for example, can apply in all extradition cases.
76 [2013] EWHC 102 (Admin) at para 34.
77 [2013] EWHC 1906 (Admin).
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mined by the requesting state’s courts as part of the trial process.78
Where a decision is required to be taken, judges are tasked with
deciding complex issues on the basis of conﬂicting evidence. This is,
of course, not unusual. However, it is submitted that in extradition
mental health cases where the consequences can be severe – indeed
matters of life and death – such position may be a concern. This is
because, in part, decisions are taken upon a non-criminal standard of
proof. Further, aﬀecting the decision making process is the fact that
diagnosis in mental health cases is based ‘‘… in most cases entirely on
behavioral criteria, deﬁned here broadly to include cognitions
(thoughts, beliefs), feelings, perceptions, desires, and actions. There is
no external standard, such as a biological or psychological marker, to
which the diagnostician can appeal to determine if the diagnosis is
accurate’’.79 This is not to suggest that the process of adjudicating
upon mental illness is wanting. Nor that the participating mental
health professions themselves are not robust and regulated.80 It is
rather to highlight that this factor can set mental health cases apart
from most physical health cases, and may be a concern in some
instances.
8.2 Unseen Disorders
A challenge related to discordant diagnoses arising in mental health
cases is based upon their non-physical, or unseen, nature. This may
give rise to heightened and perhaps at times unwarranted judicial
scepticism when they are put forward. In Sbar v Court of Bologna,
Italy, for example, the Court noted ‘‘… the need for circumspection
in evaluating the evidence when such an issue is raised in case there is
a perception that raising the issue is an easy way of avoiding extra-
78 Ibid at para 58. This is the position taken in the US, where competency is
something to be determined by the requesting state, see Romeo v Roache (1987) 820
F.2nd 540.
79 Morse, S., Mental Health and Criminal Justice, in Luna, (ed), Reforming
Criminal Justice: A Report of the Academy of Justice Bridging the Gap Between
Scholarship and Reform, Vol 1, 2018, p 251 at p 254, cited at http://academyforjus
tice.org/volume1/.
80 Part 19 of the Criminal Practice Directions provides for expert evidence, at
http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/criminal/rulesmenu-2015#Anchor6
. The Forensic Science Regulator has published a number of codes for experts
including Legal Obligations, Issue 6, August 2018, at https://www.gov.uk/govern
ment/publications/legal-obligations-issue-6.
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dition’’.81 The issue being raised was the risk of suicide. In Bobbe v
Poland, referring to the CJEU case of CK v Slovenia,82 the Divisional
Court noted that the CJEU was conscious that those opposing re-
moval might exaggerate their condition or make statements to
medical experts designed to generate the evidence needed to defeat
the threatened removal.83 It stated that the CJEU noted that in such
cases the ‘‘authorities (and the courts) are bound to form their own
considered judgment not only of the quality of the evidence before
them but also as to the risk that it has been exaggerated for forensic
ends’’.84 This is a risk that is less likely to exist in physical health
cases. It gives rise to the possibility that courts may too readily
extradite in response. Whilst of course courts must be aware that
individuals facing extradition may well feign mental illness they must
also appreciate the distinct nature of mental health disorders and the
possible severe consequences subsequent to extradition.
8.3 Prospective and Speculative Decisions
Compounding the evidential challenge facing courts is the often
prospective and speculative nature of the decisions that must be taken
in mental health cases.85 In Maziarski v Lord Advocate the High
Court of Justiciary noted in this vein that ‘‘None of the psychiatrists
before us was prepared to speak in terms of certainty – and we can
readily understand why. As Bean J observed in the Wrobel v Poland
[2011] EWHC B2 (Admin) … predictions by psychiatrists cannot, as
I see it, be in terms of certainty’’’.86 Speculation is necessary on a
number of questions additional to the mental health per se of the
requested person. These include the eﬃcacy of preventative measures
in suicide cases, and the eﬀect of the transfer and foreign detention.
These are impossible to deﬁnitively, or in some cases even reasonably,
adjudge. In Bobbe v Poland the Divisional Court noted that ‘‘… the
evaluation is not based upon an ability to form a certain or absolute
81 [2010] EWHC 1184 (Admin) at para 15.
82 [2017] 3 CMLR 10.
83 Supra note 43 at para 64.
84 Ibid.
85 As an example Bensaid v UK was distinguished from the physical health case of
D v UK where D was in the ﬁnal stages of a terminal illness on the ground of
Bensaid’s fate being more ‘‘speculative’’, as per the separate opinion of Judge Bratza,
Bensaid v UK, supra note 27 at para O–16.
86 [2012] HCJAC 33 at para 23.
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conclusion. It is based upon the realistic prospect of the requested
person recovering within a reasonable time and the ability of a court
ex ante to make that assessment’’.87 Prospective analyses of condi-
tions abroad can also give rise to concerns arising from the rules of
evidence per se. A leading Scottish case here is Kapri v HMA,88 where
the High Court of Justiciary examined whether Kapri would receive a
fair trial in Albania. In response to a number of reports being lodged
by both sides it stated ‘‘… there is no general provision which allows
the court to hold as proof of fact, merely by their production, the
content of reports or other papers emanating from foreign govern-
ments, international governmental or non-governmental bodies, or
academic or research institutions’’.89 In this regard it is important to
note that the rules of evidence in England and Wales have been
relaxed somewhat in extradition hearings in matters of, inter alia,
human rights.90
8.4 Fluid Nature of Certain Mental Health Disorders
A ﬁnal evidential issue that can aﬀect the adequacy and consistency
of decisions in extradition mental health cases is their at times ﬂuid
nature. Certain mental health disorders can change relatively quickly
and unpredictably and, of particular concern, from the original
hearing to the point of appeal. The possibility of new evidence being
admitted within an appeal therefore not uncommonly arises.
Governing the question are ss 27 and 29 and ss 104 and 106 of the
2003 Act. They inter alia provide that evidence which was not
available at the extradition hearing may be admitted if, had it been
available, it would have led the judge to decide the matter diﬀerently.
The leading case here is Hungary v Fenyvesi.91 Evidence that was not
available at the extradition hearing was held to mean evidence that
either did not exist at the time or that which was not at the disposal of
the party who wished to adduce it and which he could not with
reasonable diligence have obtained. The position, then, is that on
appeal new evidence is often put to the Court. This fact is reasonable
87 Bobbe v Poland, supra note 43 at para 40.
88 2015 JC 30.
89 Ibid at para 127.
90 See R (on the application of B) v Westminster Magistrates’’ Court [2014] UKSC
59, at para 23.
91 [2009] EWHC 231 (Admin). See also FK v Germany [2017] EWHC 2160 (Ad-
min), especially over paras 19–51.
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in that it acts to facilitate the most informed and up-to-date deci-
sion.92
Overall in regard to evidence in extradition mental health cases the
point that must be made is that unorthodox and diﬃcult questions
require decision. The positionwas aptly described by theHighCourt of
Justiciary inHowes vHMA, where it said its decisiononoppression and
mental healthwas ‘‘…not however a technical issue of law, but requires
the court to form an overall judgment upon the facts of the particular
case’’, with that judgment being onewhich ‘‘… is likely to reﬂect shades
of grey rather than black or white’’.93 The concern in the extradition
context is that such decisions are aﬀected by strong public policy rea-
sons favouring extradition. In domestic criminal trials the burden of
proof and rules of evidence operate to provide a relatively high degree
of protection to the accused. This level of protection is absent where
persons with mental health disorders are sought by way of extradition.
Developments that can serve to mitigate certain of these evidential
concerns are the production of joint medical reports and close liaison
between medical professionals in both the requesting state and the
UK.94 Clearly such concerted action is possible and should be taken
whenever beneﬁcial. Standing in contrast to the general lack of speciﬁc
accommodation of the evidential challenges arising in mental health
cases are those instances where a requested person is a suicide risk.
Here, under the oppression bar, a body of jurisprudence has developed
that governs the approach to be taken.
IX SUICIDE CASES
9.1 Oppression and Suicide Cases
The development of a set of suicide-related rules is one of the two
ways in which extradition law has speciﬁcally recognised the dis-
tinctiveness of mental health cases. These rules have been developed
92 In Bobbe v Poland, supra note 43, it was recognised that ‘‘… the situation is
moving’ and inﬂux… it would be an exercise in artiﬁciality if the Court had refused
to entertain and consider the new evidence’’, at para 28. The exceptional avenue of
re-opening an appeal under Criminal Procedure Rule 50.27 also exists, see Sadowski
v Poland [2018] EWHC 289 (Admin).
93 Supra note 24, at para 13.
94 The former was recommended in Arshad v Malta [2014] EWHC 2515 (Admin).
The latter encouraged by the Lord Chief Justice in Aswat v US, supra note 3 at paras
44–45.
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in a series of cases where a risk of suicide is said to be a consequence
of the process.95 Whilst this recognition of the risk of suicide as
meriting especial consideration is appropriate, it is not beyond criti-
cism. This is ﬁrstly because the bar in such cases is set at a particularly
high level. Secondly, these suicide-speciﬁc rules have emerged and
apply under the oppression bar alone, yet courts also entertain the
human rights and forum bars in such cases.96 More positively, the
importance of preventative measures in suicide cases has been
recognised across the jurisprudence.
The rules applicable in suicide cases under the oppression bar
were summarised by the Divisional Court in Polish Judicial
Authority v Wolkowicz. This entailed an iteration of the seven
propositions set down in Turner v Government of the USA. They
apply where an extradition may be oppressive or unjust because of
the substantial suicide risk of the requested person on account of his
mental health.97 They are that the court has to form an overall
judgment on the facts of the case, a high threshold must be met to
satisfy the bar and that the court must assess the mental state of the
individual and determine whether, if the extradition order were to
be made, there would be a substantial risk he would commit suicide
whatever steps were taken. Further, the court must ﬁnd that the
mental condition is such that capacity to resist the suicidal impulse
is removed98 and ascertain whether the requesting state has
appropriate arrangements in place to address the risk.99 Finally,
courts must keep in mind the important factor of the public interest
95 These include Polish Judicial Authority v Wolkowicz, supra note 76, Turner v
Government of the USA [2012] EWHC 2426 (Admin) and LMN v Turkey [2018]
EWHC 210 (Admin). For a discussion of a number of suicide cases see Fitzgerald,
W., Recent Human Rights Developments In Extradition Law and Related Immigration
Law, (2013) 25 Denning Law Journal 89.
96 Lauri Love’s case is the sole instance of the forum bar being successfully in-
voked in a suicide case.
97 In Polish Judicial Authority v Wolkowicz the Court refused to entertain argu-
ments based on article 3. In response to a suggestion that there is a possible dis-
tinction between ss 25 and 91 and article 3 it held that question does not arise and the
‘‘… issue will be determined… by the degree of risk of suicide and the measures in
place to prevent suicide succeeding’’, supra note 76 at para 12.
98 This has been termed a ‘‘psychologically crude and legally questionable test’’ by
Fitzgerald, supra note 95 at p 97.
99 Paradoxically in Love v US the Divisional Court held that it was not the lack of
eﬀective preventative measures that substantiated the bar, rather the pervasive nat-
ure of those measures, supra note 2 at para 103.
PAUL ARNELL
in giving eﬀect to treaty obligations.100 These propositions are
useful promoting consistency in suicide cases. They are also open to
criticism, however, by cumulatively setting the bar so high that only
in the rarest of cases will it be met.
9.2 Human Rights and Suicide Cases
The human rights bar is not uncommonly invoked alongside the
oppression bar in suicide cases.101 In South Africa v Dewani, for
example, articles 2 and 3 were put forward in conjunction with the
oppression bar. On the human rights point, it was held that the
assurances given and the facilities available meant that there was no
real and immediate threat to his life if he was extradited.102 As with
human rights violations generally within extradition, the risk of sui-
cide can relate to diﬀerent aspects of the process. In Bobbe v Po-
land103 the transfer was the concern. Whilst the Court accepted that a
transfer could in certain circumstances amount to inhuman and
degrading treatment the steps taken by the National Crime Agency
(NCA) in Bobbe’s case addressed the concerns.104 These included
inter alia a private ﬂight, liaison with the Polish authorities and
readiness for a possible suicide attempt. A suicide case focusing upon
the conditions within the requesting state and demonstrating the lack
of clarity in the relationship between the human rights and oppres-
sion bars is LMN v Turkey.105 Here it had been conceded that LMN’s
suicide risk did not provide a basis for a challenge under s 91 given
the stringency of the test. On appeal however, it was successfully
argued that the risk was relevant to article 3. The Divisional Court
accepted that there was a high risk of suicide in the event of extra-
dition and held that the suicide risk together with a failure to meet
LMN’s mental healthcare needs would in the circumstances attain the
minimum standard of severity necessary to breach his article 3
100 Supra note 76 at para 8.
101 Prior to the Crime and Courts Act 2013 the Secretary of State retained a power
to consider human rights in extradition cases. In October 2012 the then Home
Secretary Theresa May exercised that power and blocked the extradition of Gary
McKinnon due to his suicide risk, see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19957138.
102 Supra note 1 at para 55, quoting the conclusion of the Senior District Judge.
103 Supra note 43.
104 Ibid at para 61.
105 Supra note 95.
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rights.106 Relevant in the case was the then recent Turkish coup, the
absence of formal Turkish assurances and the admission of new
medical evidence as to LMN’s mental health. The appeal was allowed
and LMN was discharged. Mirroring the criticisms of the law made
above, it is unfortunate that the suicide-case jurisprudence does not
clearly distinguish between the applicability of the oppression, human
rights and forum bars in the suicide context. What is called for is a
rationalisation of applicable bars. Ideally, a single bar, that based
upon human rights, would exist to oﬀer protection in suicide cases. In
such a case the rules akin to those developed under the oppression
bar could be adopted under articles 3 and/or 8. In the meantime, or
failing a rationalisation of the bars to extradition applicable in mental
health cases, a clear and consistent judicial demarcation of the
applicability of the three bars is required. Both the nature of pro-
tection oﬀered suicidal requested persons and the law itself would
beneﬁt from such a development.
X DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES AND MENTAL HEALTH
The second instance where the law has explicitly accommodated
mental health-related concerns is found in its reaction to requested
persons who are unﬁt to plead. This has taken place through diplo-
matic assurances. A further assurance-related development can be
seen in their being tailored to address several speciﬁc mental health-
related issues. This latter point is matter of degree rather than a
speciﬁc accommodation, however, because relatively detailed assur-
ances have been used in a variety of cases. Generally, diplomatic
assurances are employed in extradition (and deportation) as a ‘‘quick,
eﬃcient and largely honoured mechanism of cooperation and regu-
lation of multilateral and bilateral inter-State relations’’.107 They are
designed to ensure that an individual being removed from a country
will not be treated, or indeed will be treated, in a certain way.108
Diplomatic assurances have come to be used in mental health cases in
a distinct way by addressing some of the issues particular to them. It
106 Ibid at para 74.
107 De Londras, F., Shannon, Saadi and Ireland’s Reliance on Diplomatic Assur-
ances under Article 3 of the ECHR, (2007) Irish Yearbook of International Law 79 at
p 80–81.
108 Internationally, the UK has made the most determined eﬀorts to devise and
apply a rights-compliant policy of deportation with assurances. Anderson, D., and
Walker, C., Deportation with Assurances, CM 9462, July 2017 at para 1.3.
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is this speciﬁc focus, as well as their conditional application in ﬁtness
to plead cases, that allows them to be distinguished from assurances
more generally. This is to be welcomed. However their use raises
concerns. These go to their seemingly ad hoc usage and questions over
compliance and veriﬁability.109 Further, they may be criticised on
account of their non-binding nature and because they might lead to
the circumvention of human rights obligations in fact.110
10.1 Conditional Nature
A ﬁrst assurance-related development in mental health cases to be
noted is that they have been utilised in a conditional way. This has
arisen in ﬁtness to plead cases. As mentioned above, here the
requesting state agrees to receive the requested person provisionally.
If the proviso or condition is not met within a certain period of time
the requesting state is obliged to return the individual to the UK. This
type of assurance was used or considered in the ﬁtness to plead cases
of Dewani v South Africa and Arshad v Malta.111 In Dewani v South
Africa112 the Divisional Court considered South Africa’s undertak-
ings in this regard. They provided that Dewani would be allowed to
return to the UK if, having been found unﬁt, the judge concludes that
there is no realistic prospect of him becoming ﬁt within eighteen
months. Further, South Africa promised that if a judge embarks to
determine whether Dewani committed the crime he was accused of,
he would be free to return. Summers QC, for Dewani, unsuccessfully
challenged several aspects of these assurances. The Divisional Court
held that the undertakings bound South Africa in international law,
109 These concerns do not apply to mental health cases alone, although it may be
argued that given the unique issues arising in such cases they are more pronounced
here than in other contexts.
110 Analysing the legal nature of diplomatic assurances in expulsion cases is
Worster, W.T., Between a Treaty and Not: A Case Study of the Legal Value of
Diplomatic Assurances in Expulsion Cases, (2012) 21 Minn J. Int’l L. 253. Worster
concludes that diplomatic assurances do in fact possess a legally binding character.
Criticising diplomatic assurances in the extradition and deportation context gener-
ally is Grozdanova, R., The UK and Diplomatic Assurances: A Minimalist Approach
towards the Anti-Torture Norm, (2015) 15 ICLR 369, and defending them is Jones,
K., Deportations with Assurances: Addressing Key Criticisms, (2008) 57(1) ICLQ 183.
111 Supra note 94. Here a joint medical report found it was unlikely that Arshad’s
mental health would improve within two years, a period longer than that which
Malta had provided he would be allowed to return to the UK. His appeal against
extradition was allowed.
112 Supra note 1.
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that they were properly made and that they meant that if a judge
could not decide whether Dewani would remain unﬁt in 18 months he
would be allowed to return to the UK. This conditional type of
assurance was designated a ‘‘Dewani-type’’ assurance in Bobbe v
Poland – a case which touches upon one of the two general criticisms
of assurances made below, their seemingly random usage.
10.2 Speciﬁcation of Assurances
A second relevant feature of assurances in mental health cases is the
degree of distinct speciﬁcation that has been sought and given.113
Clearly illustrating this development is the series of cases involving
Haroon Aswat, decided by the ECtHR and the English Divisional
Court. Aswat was sought by the US on terrorist related oﬀences. The
process leading to his eventual extradition took almost a decade,
during which the issuance of speciﬁc and tailored assurances was
central. Indeed, over the period assurances were given by the US on
four separate occasions. In them the US inter alia guaranteed that
Aswat would not be tried by a military commission in Guantanamo
Bay, nor subjected to the death penalty if convicted.114 It then
guaranteed that Aswat would be able to argue he was not ﬁt to plead,
would have his competency assessed, and that that assessment could
be appealed. Assurances concerning his pre-trial detention and the
accommodation of his mental state if convicted were also given.115
The ECtHR considered these assurances and found them lacking. In
doing so it reiterated the point that where an individual suﬀers from a
mental health disorder ‘‘increased vigilance in reviewing whether the
Convention has (or will be) complied with’’ is called for.116 Subse-
quently the US issued a further eleven undertakings addressing the
concerns raised. These inter alia related to Aswat’s transfer to the US,
his arrival and the role of his treating clinician. Following these
assurances, and a further clariﬁcation, both the Divisional Court117
and subsequently the ECtHR118 held that Aswat could be extradited.
113 This is not to suggest that detailed and bespoke terms are not found in non-
mental health related assurances. Rather that it appears that such assurances are
more prevalent in mental health cases.
114 [2006] EWHC 2927 (Admin) at paras 25–26.
115 This is detailed in Aswat v UK supra note 3 at paras 27–29.
116 Ibid at para 50.
117 Aswat v Secretary of State, supra note 3.
118 Aswat v UK, Ap. No. 62176/14, supra note 3.
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Clearly, in this instance the ‘‘increased vigilance’’ led to assurances of
a high degree of speciﬁcation designed to address concerns arising in
a mental health case.
10.3 Varied Practice
A criticism that can be made of assurances is their random usage and
the lack of a regulatory framework governing them.119 Requests for
assurances normally follow judicial concern that an extradition
would engender a human rights violation in the requesting state or be
oppressive. There is not clear guidance or practice governing when
they will be sought or, related to this, whether there may be an
obligation upon a court to seek them. This appears to be particularly
relevant as regards Dewani-type assurances. In Bobbe v Poland it was
agreed that Bobbe was unﬁt to plead. His counsel argued that the
judge at Bobbe’s hearing should have obtained a conditional assur-
ance and that its absence led to his extradition being unjust and
oppressive. Whilst the NCA had sought such an assurance the Polish
Judicial Authority’s response did not speciﬁcally and precisely ad-
dress its terms. The Divisional Court held, however, there was no
inevitable legal obligation to obtain assurances in the case of re-
quested persons who were presently unﬁt to plead.120 The test gov-
erning the seeking of assurances, it held, was fact sensitive and only in
certain circumstances was an assurance necessary. In Dewani v South
Africa, the Court noted, it was relevant that the appellant had no
connection to South Africa and that there was the possibility that he
might be permanently unﬁt to plead.121 The circumstances were dif-
ferent in Bobbe v Poland. His mental health condition was not
thought permanent, and somewhat unusually, he was sought on both
conviction and accusation warrants. He faced, therefore, a period of
imprisonment where treatment would be available. The point made
here is that in certain mental health cases assurances are sought and
others not – with the distinction turning on the facts of each case.
Whilst this is not unreasonable, the law lacks a clear and authorita-
tive judicial pronouncement upon their use and content. Such a
119 That written, the ECtHR has authoritatively pronounced upon the factors a
court must take into account in evaluating an assurance, in Othman v UK (2012) 55
EHRR 1.
120 Supra note 43 at para 37.
121 South Africa v Dewani (No 2), supra note 1 at para 57.
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precedent would be beneﬁcial in fostering consistency and under-
standing.
10.4 Compliance and Veriﬁability
A ﬁnal and general concern in the area of assurances relates to
requesting state compliance and veriﬁability. Whilst these are not
speciﬁc to mental health cases they are, of course, included. In Aswat
v Secretary of State, for example, counsel for Aswat argued that since
the management of Aswat’s US trial would be under the jurisdiction
of a District Judge there could be no certainty the steps proposed by
other United States authorities will be fulﬁlled. This was summarily
rejected. Although the executive gives the assurances and cannot bind
the judiciary, the Court noted, ‘‘… the judiciary is part of the State
which gives assurances… a judge being aware of those assurances can
reasonably be expected to see that his State is not put in breach of its
assurances by his or her own actions’’.122 Justice Mitting continued
‘‘I regard it fanciful to suggest that a judge would deliberately and for
no good reason put at risk the mental health of a defendant in breach
of such assurances’’.123 More generally, the House of Lords Select
Committee on Extradition has stated that ‘‘… assurances should al-
ways be handled carefully and subjected to rigorous scrutiny… the
importance of ensuring that they are genuine and eﬀective cannot be
overestimated’’.124 It is clear, though, that once an individual has
been extradited compliance with assurances ultimately turns on the
good faith of the requesting state. Veriﬁcation by the UK that they
have been followed, if allowed by the requesting state, is resource
intensive.125 Overall, diplomatic assurances in extradition mental
health cases are a mixed blessing. They may usefully ensure that
requested persons are not subjected to human rights violations and
oppressive and unjust treatment. They also can act to prevent an
individual who is unﬁt to plead from remaining too long in a
requesting state untried. However, their use is ad hoc and they entail a
risk of non-compliance. What is needed is greater standardisation
122 Supra note 3 at para 16.
123 Ibid.
124 House of Lords Select Committee on Extradition Law, Extradition: UK Law
and Practice, supra note 5 at para 88.
125 The UK has, however, made considerable eﬀorts to ensure compliance, see
Anderson and Walker, supra note 108.
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and consistency in their usage. This would almost certainly act to
ameliorate at least some of their failings.
XI CONCLUSION
Mental health disorders in UK extradition law and practice are
inconsistently and inadequately addressed. The law applying to them
is multi-faceted and unnecessarily complex. It is accordingly unpre-
dictable and seemingly random. This position ﬂows from the law’s
failure to adequately recognise that mental health cases may raise
issues not arising in physical health cases. That much is clear. The
steps needed to improve the law, however, will not be easily achieved.
This is because, in part, extradition necessarily entails an accommo-
dation of conﬂicting interests. The desire to address international
criminality and to adhere to international extradition agreements can
be at odds with the human rights and welfare of requested persons.
Simply, the cooperative and protective facets of the process cannot be
wholly reconciled. Mental health disorders introduce a new and
complicating factor into this equation. The facts of each case are, of
course, diﬀerent. Legislatively or judicially pronouncing upon even
common situations is not possible. Too many variables are at play.
That noted, greater clarity and consistency are achievable. Legislative
simpliﬁcation of the applicable bars to extradition is one way that this
can be done. Ideally, the law would contain a single applicable bar to
extradition based upon human rights. This would be applicable in
mental health cases and generally. This is not as radical as it may
seem. As the law stands the human rights bar generally accommo-
dates circumstances also falling under the oppression and forum bars.
If those bars were to be removed from the law the inherent ﬂexibility
under the human rights bar would almost certainly admit situations
not presently covered. In the absence of this type of legislative
intervention, an authoritative judicial pronouncement upon the cir-
cumstances in which the bars to extradition apply, and the relation-
ship between them, is needed. This would most likely go some way in
improving the law.
Overlap and inconsistency in the application of the bars to
extradition in mental health cases is but one facet of the law requiring
consideration. Evidentially, greater use of joint medical reports as
well as regular communication between medical professionals abroad
and in the UK are required. The acceptance by the law that mental
health cases can give rise to distinct issues is a ﬁrst step in mitigating
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the evidential concerns existing presently. This would loosen the
evidential shackles in extradition cases, and permit more holistic
analyses. As indeed would the acceptance of extradition hearings
themselves as sui generis quasi-criminal proceedings.126 Particularly
related to the need for a rationalisation of the bars to extradition are
suicide cases. A single applicable bar, which failing an authoritative
judicial pronouncement, is needed to clarify and standardise the rules
applying to requested persons at risk of suicide. Presently, the three
applicable bars serve the cause of obfuscation as much as the law and
individuals concerned. A similar process of standardisation is also
called for in the use and content of diplomatic assurances, especially
in cases where ﬁtness to plead is an issue. Here, as above, coherence
and consistency are served through law that is settled and therefore
applied similarly in diﬀerent cases. Overall, it is clear that the law has
tentatively recognised the particular issues arising in extradition
mental health cases. This is to be welcomed. It is now time, however,
for the law to take stock of that recognition and to legislatively and
judicially accept that a number of the issues arising within mental
health cases are distinct and demand speciﬁc and systematic regula-
tion.
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